adds to his triple-A analysis of knowledge, a triple-S analysis of competence, where a complete competence combines its seat, shape and situation. Much of Sosa's influential work assumes that epistemic agents are individuals who acquire knowledge when they hit the truth through exercising their own individual skills in appropriate shapes and situations. This paper explores an extension of Sosa's framework to a social setting in which groups constitute epistemic agents over and above their individual members. The claim is that groups can be ascribed knowledge in virtue of hitting the truth through exercising their competences in appropriate shapes and situations. While knowledge at the collective level may diverge from knowledge at the individual level, the competences of groups are nothing over and above the combined competences of their members. The ensuing view thus has implications for the debate over reduction and supervenience in collective epistemology.
Sosa's virtue epistemology
Many virtue epistemologists aim to develop a theory of knowledge which provides solutions to a number of hard problems, such as the Gettier problem or the problem of how knowledge can have distinct epistemic value. 1 While they disagree over the details, most hold that believing truly through epistemic virtue is necessary and sufficient for knowledge. 2 According to Sosa's (2007 Sosa's ( , 2009 Sosa's ( , 2010 Sosa's ( , 2011 Sosa's ( , 2015 highly influential version of virtue epistemology, knowledge is a cognitive achievement, where an achievement is an apt performance, i.e. a belief or other performance that is accurate because adroit. Let's unpack this triple-A structure of knowledge. 3 Knowledge implies not just accuracy or truth, but also a belief that is formed out of epistemic virtue. A belief formed on the basis of reading tea leaves or crystal ball gazing cannot constitute knowledge even if true. But when formed through competences, i.e. reliable cognitive abilities, which is how Sosa prefers to view epistemic virtues, the belief is adroit. 4 Accuracy and adroitness are, however, still insufficient for knowledge, as is illustrated by standard Gettier-cases involving intervening epistemic luck. Consider a familiar case: you form the belief that there's a sheep in the field through exercising your reliable visual apparatus. In actual fact you see a rock which looks just like a sheep, but you still believe truly because a sheep is hidden behind the rock. So, the belief you form is both accurate and adroit. To rule out the possibility that the truth of a belief be down to such happenstance, Sosa requires aptness for knowledge, i.e. that the belief be true because competently formed. Apt belief, for Sosa, is knowledge. Sosa (2010 Sosa ( , 2015 also proposes a triple-S analysis of competence comprising an innermost (or constitutional) S-competence, which is the seat (or skill), an inner SS-competence, which is the combination of seat and shape, and a complete SSScompetence, which is the conjunction of seat, shape and situation. As an example, if the complete competence is being a competent driver of a vehicle on a certain occasion, then the seat is the basic driving skill, the shape is being awake, sober, alert, etc., and the situation is being seated at the wheel, in a reliable vehicle, on a dry road, etc. The connection between the triple-A analysis of a performance and the triple-S analysis of a competence is the following: a performance is apt when its success manifests competence, which happens just in case the seat causally produces the success in combination with an appropriate shape and situation. 5 The seat of the competence is determined as the causal basis for a success-response of an object when subjected to a stimulus in certain shape and situation combinations. Since a complete competence 1 For more on the value of knowledge see Kvanvig (2003) . 2 Some virtue epistemologists, such as Baehr (2012) , merely claim that intellectual (character) virtues deserve a central place in epistemology. 3 For two prominent defenses of alternative versions, see Zagzebski (1996) and Greco (2009 Greco ( , 2012 . 4 Following Sosa (2015, p. 171) , a competence is a reliable "dispositional ability to discern the true from the false in a certain domain." And belief comes in two varieties (2015, p. 178) : credence above a certain confidence threshold, or (disposition to) affirmative judgment. 5 One might distinguish between direct and indirect causal production. To illustrate, the goals Rooney scores manifest his football abilities, but his salary constitutes no manifestation of those abilities. Only the goals are caused directly by his innermost skill when in the right shape and situation. His innermost skills merely play an indirect causal role in accounting for the pay Rooney receives.
is necessarily a competence to reliably succeed when trying for some outcome, such that if one tried, one would very likely succeed, no such competence can bring about that outcome. Only the seat can do that when the shape and situation are conducive to the outcome.
The key point for our purposes is that Sosa treats the 'because' relation in 'accurate because adroit' on the model of competence manifestation, such that knowledge amounts to competence manifesting success, which happens when the seat produces the success in suitable shape and situation. 6 Given that Sosa (2007 Sosa ( , p. 29, 2009 equates knowledge-yielding competences with reliable cognitive abilities of individual agents, such competences are explicitly taken to have physical bases wholly resident in those agents. When the triple-S analysis is added, the claim is that the innermost skills supervene on physical features of individual agents, as do the shapes which pertain to more changeable bodily or mental features of those agents. If we call those physical or mental features that are located inside the skin-and-skull of individuals 'individualistic properties', then the claim is that in so far as knowledge is concerned, the seat and shape of competences supervene on individualistic properties. 7 Now, the foregoing individualistic account of competences has limited applicability in that much of our knowledge depends heavily on the competences of others. Indeed, a well-known problem for virtue epistemology is to account for the acquisition of ordinary testimonial knowledge where the truth of the recipient's belief is primarily because of the testifier's competence. Lackey's (2007, p. 352) example of Morris approaching a passerby for directions is a case in point. Even if the recipient's contribution in terms of testimony-receiving competences cannot be neglected, surely it is surpassed by the contribution of the testifier on whose epistemic credentials the recipient is relying. Thus, one might insist that a recipient reliably detects trustworthy testifiers, but such ability primarily plays a role in explaining the presence of the testimonial belief rather than the truth of that belief. As Goldberg argued (2010), whether a recipient's testimonial belief amounts to knowledge depends very significantly on the reliability of cognitive processing taking place in the testifier. But as long as competences are construed individualistically, the virtue epistemologist has it that whether such belief counts as knowledge is primarily a matter of the reliability of processes that occur squarely inside the recipient.
Individualism about competences may stem from the way in which the virtue epistemologist typically seeks to explain the special value of certain types of knowledge. For just as Sosa's virtue epistemology offers a promising response to certain Gettier cases, his view is also well placed to account for such value. Here is the rough idea. 8 An individual agent's knowledge is a distinctive cognitive achievement on her part 6 An influential, alternative way of unpacking the 'because' relation, among virtue epistemologists, is Greco's causal-explanatory salience model, as in his (2009). 7 Since the situation component of complete competences pertains to features of the individual agent's local environment, these competences will supervene on the conjunction of individualistic properties and such features. Understanding complete competences in this way squares well with Sosa's claim that cases of environmental epistemic luck, e.g. fake barn cases, are compatible with the formation of apt beliefs; or so Kallestrup and Pritchard (2014) argue. 8 Sosa (2007). when she is intellectually successful through her own competence (or adroitness). Think of perceptual or deductive knowledge. Since being accurate because competent is more valuable than being merely accurate, indeed more valuable than being both accurate and competent but not accurate because competent, knowledge has distinctive epistemic value. Such value corresponds to the credit (or praise) an individual agent deserves when forming apt beliefs, which is greater than any credit assigned on the basis of mere accuracy, or competence, or both. This account works less well when knowledge is acquired predominantly on the basis of epistemic reliance on others. In the case of testimony the recipient's intellectual success is primarily through the competence of the testifier, and so when it comes to the assignment of credit, the testifier is more deserving than the recipient. Since the subject of testimonial knowledge is the recipient, it seems the assignment of such knowledge cannot, as Greco (2007, p. 57) suggests, be understood in terms of the assignment of credit. The cognitive achievement is rather a result of shared endeavor. Now, it should be mentioned in fairness that Sosa is fully aware of the limitations of the foregoing individualistic account of competences. Indeed, in the specific context of testimonial knowledge (2007, pp. 93-98; 2011, pp. 86-90) , he acknowledges that the truth of testimonial beliefs cannot be down to the individual recipient's competence, but must rather be attributable tosocially seated competences. After all, chains of testimonial exchange can stretch widely across otherwise disparate parties. Thus, Sosa (2011, p. 88) proposes a non-individualistic account of competence according to which you know p if and only if believing truly at least partially manifests a competence of yours, in doing which it also fully manifests a possibly complex competence seated at least partially in you. However, when applied to testimony what needs manifest the recipient's competence is not the formation of testimonial belief, but rather the truth of the belief formed. Otherwise, the recipient makes no contribution to the aptness of the testimonial belief. On the face of it, the kinds of competence Sosa pinpoints as seated in the recipient, i.e. relevant command of English and placing trust in the testimony, account at best for the recipient believing a given proposition. In commonor-garden cases, such competences hardly contribute to the truth of what is believed. Consequently, the truth is to no extent down to complex competences the social seat of which includes the recipient. Other testimony-receiving competences may fare better in this respect. Greco (2007 Greco ( , p. 63, cf. 2012 invokes an ability to discriminate good from bad testimony. If fleshed out in terms of being a reliable assessor of testimony, e.g. being able to weed out ill-founded testimony, such ability will constitute at least a minor contribution to the truth of the testimonial belief. Hence, by the non-individualistic account of competences, that belief may well count as knowledge in virtue of its truth being attributable to a complex social competence seated partially in the recipient.
The foregoing raises a number of intriguing questions about the nature of socially seated competences. But the knowledge such complex competences can generate would at best be attributable to individuals. We will instead focus on competences that are seated in organized social units so as to produce knowledge attributable to collectives. In Sect. 2 we shall make the case that organized collectives are sui generis knowing agents, indeed they are capable of knowing propositions none of their members know. In Sect. 3 we shall then extend Sosa's virtue-theoretic framework to collectives which are such that the competences of their members contribute to the truth of their beliefs. 9 Finally, in Sect. 4 we make some brief remarks regarding reduction and supervenience in light of the account of collective knowledge and competences we develop in Sect. 3.
Collective epistemology
Mainstream theories of knowledge are concerned with the question of what converts true (properly based, non-defeated) belief into knowledge. Candidate properties for what is responsible for the conversion include: being produced by a reliable cognitive process, and being supported by enough mentalist evidence. 10 Likewise, virtue epistemologists appeal to the property of being true because of competence. While these are distinct epistemic properties of belief states, such competing theories could all accept that individuals and collectives alike are capable of being in states of belief and knowledge. 11 Disagreement over what makes the difference between true belief and knowledge is compatible with shared liberalism about which entities can be in such states. But why think that's true of collectives? One observation concerns ordinary parlance. We speak uncontroversially about teams, institutions, boards, courts, organisations, firms, committees, associations, clubs, churches, armies, governments, etc., as having a range of epistemic properties. They serve as testifiers, 12 are epistemically responsible in their inquiries, 13 make judgments on the basis of evidence they possess, 14 acquire knowledge on which they ought to act, 15 and so on. The ubiquity and diversity of such talk present a reason to take its content at face value. Were we invariably mistaken about collectives having such properties, a drastic revision of epistemic discourse would be called for. Of course, we also say 'the flowers know when to blossom', or 'my computer knows me better than my friends', but such talk is loose as the normative aspect of the concept of knowledge is entirely missing. Flowers and computers are neither epistemically responsible for what they do, nor do they deserve praise for getting things right. But might not some true attributions of knowledge lack a normative dimension, such as talk of knowledge had by certain animals or young 9 The focus is throughout on Sosa's work, but nothing in the following rules out applicability of other virtue epistemologies to collectives, indeed mentalist evidentialist, process reliabilist, or other non-virtue-theoretic accounts of knowledge might also embrace ascriptions of group knowledge. See also fn. 26. 10 See Goldman (1986) and Conee and Feldman (2004) , respectively.
11 Goldman (2014) develops a notion of degree of group justifiedness roughly on the basis of the proportion of its members who justifiably believes the target proposition by the lights of process reliabilism. 12 "Apple testify before congressional panel over locked iPhone", (The Denver Post, 2nd March 2016). For similar examples see Tollefsen (2007) . 13 "The Conservatives' 'independent' investigation into the 'Tatler Tory' scandal was already unravelling last night as it emerged the law firm conducting the inquiry has worked for the party for years", (The Daily Mail, 2nd December 2015).
children? 16 Suppose both are capable of having beliefs. 17 In that case, they may form true beliefs as a result of reliable cognitive processes, but such low-grade knowledge would still involve some normative evaluation, e.g. when rewarded for reliably produced, cognitive success. Still, they are by any reckoning incapable of attaining an epistemic perspective on their first-order beliefs, and so lack the kind of high-grade knowledge which implies a wider range of normative assessments. In contrast, we ordinarily speak as if collectives are subject even to such high-grade knowledge, say, in the way credit is assigned when collectives scrutinise the credentials of their evidence, or otherwise reflect on their epistemic pursuits, or when they are held to account for failing to act on a body of knowledge they possess, due to not drawing the right inferences between individual pieces of knowledge. 18 A second question is whether the epistemic properties that collectives instantiate can differ from those that some or all of their members instantiate. The following view gives a negative answer:
(SUMMATIVISM) A group g has epistemic property E if and only if at least one individual i is both a member of g and has E (Eg ↔ ∃i (i ∈ g&Ei)). 19 However, so-called divergence arguments challenge (SUMMATIVISM), as they purport to offer counterexamples to that bi-conditional. 20 Consider what Schmitt (1994, p. 273 ) calls a 'chartered group', which is a group "founded to perform a particular action or actions of a certain kind […] with the understanding that the group will perform only such actions." When a group has a charter, as constituted by the intentions of its founding members, its actions aim to fulfill its office as specified by that charter. A chartered group would not exist without its office. Importantly, the standards of justification for chartered groups depend on the social role of the group as devolved from its office in ways in which the standards of justification for its individual members do not. Take criminal proceedings in a UK court of law for which the standards of evidence include that hearsay normally be excluded, and that the standard of proof be beyond a reasonable doubt. These special standards govern how the criminal court must perform as devolved from the office of such courts. Consider now the first example involving chartered groups. 16 Thanks to an anonymous referee for raising this question. 17 As Kornblith (2007) argues against Williams (2004) and others. 18 A friend of group knowledge would ideally need to address the challenges that are raised within social epistemology by Wray (2001) and Meijers (2002) to do with the implausibility of group belief as required for group knowledge, and by Lackey (2014) and Carter (2015) to do with alleged epistemic defeat of group knowledge, as well as in the cognitive science literature on group minds and cognition, e.g. to do with putative causal powers of such minds, as in Rupert (2005; manuscript) . Our discussion is premised on the possibility of satisfactory answers. For example, Wray (2007) proposes that group knowledge be understood in terms of justified true acceptances. 19 A problem with (SUMMATIVISM) arises when two members of g instantiate incompatible properties. One can instead characterize the summativist view in terms of all or most of the members of g instantiating some epistemic property as being necessary and sufficient for g instantiating that property. Since our counterexamples to (SUMMATIVISM) are also counterexamples to this formulation, we stick with (SUMMATIVISM) for the sake of simplicity. 20 See Tollefsen (2007, pp. 300-301) and Lackey (2014, pp. 66-70) for a survey of cases.
(CRIMINAL COURT) A defendant is on trial for the crime of careless driving. The prosecution adduces evidence from the police report, as well as eyewitnesses testifying in court that the defendant was indeed driving the van that hit the victim. But the jury finds the evidence not beyond a reasonable doubt, and hence insufficient to validate criminal conviction. All the members of the jury have hearsay evidence from a reliable source that the defendant caused the accident. But the judge instructs the jurors to ignore this evidence as it fails to meet the conditions for being ruled admissible in a criminal court. Consequently, the jury, when functioning in its social office, justifiably believes the defendant is innocent, yet none of the individual jurors justifiably believes this proposition.
Since the evidence available to the jurors distributively is unavailable to them jointly, (CRIMINAL COURT) is a counterexample to (SUMMATIVISM), because a collective lacks an epistemic property instantiated by at least one of its members.
The second example involves two distinct charted groups whose members are identical. Let the first group be our jury from (CRIMINAL COURT), and let the second group be a jury in a UK civil court comprising the same jurors. Note that the standards of evidence in civil litigation include that hearsay is normally regarded as admissible evidence, and that the standard of proof be by a preponderance of the evidence. Again, these special standards govern how the civil court must operate in its legal capacity. Consider now the following:
(CIVIL COURT) Just as in (CRIMINAL COURT), a van is alleged to have hit a victim in a traffic accident, and the victim is now suing the driver for damages in a civil court. A jury comprising the same jurors as in (CRIMINAL COURT) is presented with the same police report and the same witnesses in court as in (CRIMINAL COURT). After all, evidence from a criminal trial is typically also admissible in a civil action about the same matter. Moreover, all the jurors have hearsay evidence from a reliable source that the defendant is responsible for the accident. Since the judge rules such hearsay admissible, the jury finds the defendant liable on balance of the probabilities. Consequently, both the jury and the individual jurors justifiably believe that proposition.
In (CIVIL COURT) the jury has enough evidence to justifiably believe the defendant was responsible for the accident, whereas in (CRIMINAL COURT) the jury lacks evidence to justifiably believe that proposition. The individual jurors arguably believe that proposition in both cases, but no matter what they believe, (CIVIL COURT) poses a counterexample to (SUMMATIVISM). As long as all the jurors believe the same proposition in the two cases, one of the two juries believes a proposition none of its members believe. And there is no reason why the jurors should flip-flop on that proposition as they have available for deliberation the very same evidence in the two cases.
Our two cases establish an epistemic divergence between a collective and its individual members on the assumption that distinct epistemic standards apply to collectives and their respective members. One may object that whatever standards apply to jurors jointly also apply to them distributively relative to their jury memberships, so that high standards apply to individual jurors in criminal proceedings, whereas lower standards apply to them individually in civil litigation. That, however, would be a mischaracterization. When jurors are considered as individual agents rather than as jury members, they are not bound by a legal charter whose office their actions aim to fulfil. Therefore, since the epistemic standards that apply to them when thus considered are independent of the role of the jury, those standards remain unchanged as these same individuals form distinct juries. One may also object that a more natural reading of the second case is that the two groups are epistemically indiscernible in that they only differ in what they can decide from a legal perspective, as opposed to believe from an epistemic perspective. 21 In reply, the key here is that the relevant standards that govern different juries are epistemic in the sense that they fix the types and strengths of evidence which can be brought to bear when juries reach a decision (or form a belief). So, while a jury decision is strictly a legal act, its justification is an epistemic property of that group. For such justification is a matter of the jury basing their decision on permissible and strong enough evidence, which in turn is constrained by those standards. And because the standards may differ from jury to jury, so will the epistemic properties of arriving at justified decisions. 22 Let's take stock. Section 2 argued that mainstream theories of knowledge, including virtue epistemology, are perfectly consistent with collectives being sui generis epistemic agents. Reasons were then offered for thinking that in actual fact collective agents instantiate a range of epistemic properties. What is more, we argued from cases that collectives can instantiate epistemic properties not instantiated by any of their individual members. Section 3 revisits our virtue epistemology from Sect. 1 against this background. We shall show that Sosa's framework can be extended to embrace group knowledge. Finally, Sect. 4 will briefly position the ensuing virtue-theoretic view in the wider debate in social epistemology over reduction and supervenience.
Towards collective virtues
In the previous section we argued against (SUMMATIVISM) that the epistemic properties of collectives diverge from those of its members. Since such properties require intentional agency, these collectives must be recognised as intentional agents in their own right. So, what is it for a collective to count as a group agent, capable of holding propositional attitudes and of acting on those attitudes? Following Pettit (2006, 2011) , a group agent is roughly a collection of individuals, which is organized in such a way as to have a capacity to act, through the contributions of its members, so as to pursue its desires or goals in accordance with its beliefs about its environment. Their take on group agency is merely an application to groups of atopic-neutral, functional definition of agency in terms of being able to intervene in the world so as to fulfil desires or achieve goals if corresponding beliefs are true. When groups fill the 21 Here I am grateful to an anonymous referee. 22 Following Quinton (1975) , List (2014) notes that there are collectives to which observers can ascribe "aggregate attitudes", e.g. public opinion of an electorate, which are constructs that play no direct social roles within those collectives. An aggregate attitude of a collective is a mere function of the attitudes of its individual members, as produced by some aggregation rule. The collectives to which such attitudes can be ascribed neither engage in joint action, nor even conceptualize themselves as groups.
functional role characteristic of the agency of individuals, they are able to mimic the intentional and rational actions of individuals, and so should be regarded as proper agents in order to avoid any prejudice or chauvinism.
An important question is about the organizational and intentional structure required for a collective to count as a group agent. Bearing in mind the different ways groups operate, the details will differ from group to group, but some general constraints are worth highlighting. These stem from the way in which chartered groups are characterized in terms of intentions common to their members, as well as actions aiming to fulfil their office (i.e. task, goal, purpose) as determined by the relevant charter (i.e. rules, norms, standards). Let's begin with joint intentions (or we-intentions), which are best understood as individual intentions joined together when shared by members of the collective. 23 A collective is a group agent only if (i) its individual members intend that the collective act and form attitudes together, i.e. each of these individuals must intend that they together enact the joint performance and come to a group attitude. 24 Moreover, (ii) each must intend to do their part, and (iii) intend to do so because of their belief that others intend to do their bit. Importantly, these joint intentions need not involve individual intentions to form particular output attitudes of the group. That is to say, while each member must intend that the group form attitudes as a result of joint action, no single member need intend to form, let alone accept, any specific attitudes that the group forms. 25 A different but related set of constraints concerns the office of the collective as fixed by its charter. A collective is a group agent only if its (founding) members jointly set up common goals and agree on how to proceed in order to meet them. Both the ends and the means, which are carried out for the purpose of achieving them, are captured by the group's charter, which is sometimes formally enshrined in a system of laws, other times its existence is evidenced by the practice of the group and its members. When these two sets of constraints are met, a collection of individuals unites in forming a rational agent in its own right. They are the glue that joins individuals together as an agent with a cohesive mind of its own.
Let's now transpose the foregoing into an epistemic setting where a collection of individuals constitutes a sui generis epistemic agent. Given the foregoing, we can separate out three distinct components to such group agency: (i) the individual epistemic contributions, (ii) the joint intentions in so far as they bear epistemically on the group, and (iii) the epistemic means and ends as set out by the charter and its associated office. Let's deal with these in turn when viewed through the lens of Sosa' virtue 23 The following owes much to Pettit and Schweikard (2006) , following Bratman (1999) , Gilbert (2001 Gilbert ( , 2013 and Tuomela (1995 Tuomela ( , 2005 . In contrast, Searle (1990 Searle ( , 2010 holds the rather perplexing view that although collective attitudes are irreducible to individual attitudes, there exist no attitudes over and above the attitudes of individuals. Birch (draft) offers an interesting account of joint know-how in terms of joint intention to action and contributing individual actions. 24 We restrict attention throughout to non-coerced and non-deceived groups. Everything is above board. For example, we shall not classify Block's (1978) Chinese nation scenario as an instance of group agency or intentionality. 25 The joint intentions that we require for group agency differ from Gilbert's (1989, p. 306 ) so-called joint acceptance account according to which a group believes p just in case its members jointly accept p.
epistemology. 26 To refresh, knowledge is apt belief, i.e. a belief whose truth manifests competence. Given that a complete competence comprises seat, shape and situation, a belief is apt just in case the seat causally produces its truth in combination with an appropriate shape and situation. So, just as an individual has knowledge when the truth of her belief is a product of her innermost competence (i.e. the seat of her complete competence) in suitable shape and situation, a group has knowledge when the truth of its belief is a product of its innermost competence in suitable shape and situation. But here is a crucial disanalogy. On the one hand, a group's innermost competence is reducible to a summation of innermost competences of its individual members and their manner of arrangement within the group. Of course, a group may have innermost competences that none of its individual members have in isolation, but that's compatible with the former being reducible to the totality of individual innermost competences, given how they are brought to bear within the group. Novel competences of groups do not spring into existence or mysteriously emerge when conjoining existing individual ones. On the other hand, the aptness of group belief is not similarly reducible to the aptness of the beliefs of its individual members. As we shall see, it's possible for the aptness of group belief to diverge from the aptness of a majority of, or indeed every single, individual belief, and so there is no question of the former being captured by a summation of the latter. Reasons for the disanalogy include that a group's innermost competence can produce the truth of its belief even though no individual beliefs are even formed, and that the shape and situation that are suitable for a group's innermost competence to produce the truth of its belief differ from the shape and situation that are suitable for the individual innermost competences to produce the truths of individual beliefs. Thus, there are various ways in which a group can be such that the truth of its belief manifests competence, its innermost competence is nothing over and above the joint innermost competences of its individual members, yet the truth of its belief manifesting competence does not consist in the truths of its members' beliefs manifesting their competences. Here are two examples illustrating this disanalogy. The first example, due to Bird (2014, p. 57; cf. 2010, pp. 34-35) , exploits the ubiquitous phenomenon of distributed cognition 27 : (SCIENCE) Dr X, a physicist, and Dr Y, a mathematician, collaborate on a project to demonstrate the truth of the conjecture that q. Their project can be broken down into three parts. Part one is a problem in physics, the problem of showing that p, which will be the work of Dr X alone. Part two is a problem in pure mathematics, that of proving that if p then q, for which Dr Y takes sole responsibility. Part three is an application of modus ponens to the results of 26 As mentioned in fn. 9, this paper concentrates exclusively on extending Sosa's theory of knowledge to include groups. Other accounts of knowledge, virtue-theoretic or not, may also be compatible with group knowledge, but the following make evident why Sosa's virtue epistemology lends itself to such knowledge by emphasising the role of reliable cognitive abilities which is applicable to groups. 27 Distributed cognition involves a division of cognitive labour within the group such that the cognitive task of producing group knowledge is divided into sub-tasks which are then assigned to sub-groups or individuals who have expertise in the pertinent areas. An individual is a member of the group in virtue of filling a functional role, which is characteristic of performing such a sub-task. For actual cases in science of distributed cognition on a large scale and corresponding assignment of partial credit for epistemic accomplishments, see Cooper (2010) and Westphal (2014) . parts one and two. They arrange for an assistant to publish the paper if and only if the assistant receives from Dr X the demonstration that p is true and from Dr Y the proof of p → q (the brief final part with the application of modus ponens has been prewritten). We can imagine that Drs X and Y have no other communication with each other or with the assistant and so do not know at the time of publication that q has been proven.
Here the research team comprising Drs X and Y comes to know q, yet neither of them knows that proposition. Nor does the assistant whom we assume lacks expertise in both physics and maths to grasp the demonstration that p and the proof of p → q. The assistant should therefore not be counted as a member of the team. All he has to do is press 'save' upon receiving the information that p from Dr X and that p → q from Dr Y, and then 'upload' and 'submit' on a journal website. In this example, the truth of the research team's belief that q is caused by its innermost competence, which is exhausted by conjoining Drs X and Y's innermost competences. Naturally, while both could easily draft part three of the paper, only Dr Y should be tasked with the mathematical proof, and only Dr X should take on the problem in physics. When combined adequately, the research team thus has no innermost competence in addition to what the two members contribute. 28 Yet, neither of them forms the belief that q, and so trivially the team's belief that q being true because of its competence cannot consist in its members' belief that q being true because of their competences. In other words, the team has knowledge none of its members have, and so the aptness of its belief is irreducible to a function of the aptness of its members' beliefs. Still, the innermost competence of the team is exhausted by the combined innermost competences of its members, and so this case illustrates that while such group competence is reducible, corresponding group apt belief is irreducible.
The second example, due to List (2012) , is a standard discursive dilemma:
What (FIGURE 1) shows is that inconsistent aggregated belief results from consistent individual beliefs, given majority rule and deductive closure on individual and aggregated beliefs. Assume also that both p and q are true, and that the truth of any 28 True, the research team would be unable to know q had it not been for the assistant, but here we must distinguish between relevant epistemic and relevant non-epistemic competences. The assistant's contribution is relevant in this counterfactual sense, but it plays no justificatory role vis-à-vis the belief that q. It's also true that Drs X and Y rely on the work of other scientists. No team conducts research in a vacuum. Suppose Dr X's proof of p → q depends on Dr Z's proof of a certain lemma. Clearly, Dr Z's contribution is epistemically relevant, albeit only indirectly so. But whatever (indirect) relevant epistemic contribution agents outwith the research team make towards Dr X's knowledge that p → q will also count as a (indirect) relevant epistemic contribution towards the team's knowledge of that proposition. belief is because of competence. In that case, individual 1 forms an apt belief that p & q, where competence amounts to forming that belief on the basis of inference from the apt beliefs that p and that q. Individuals 2 and 3 only form apt beliefs in p and q, respectively. Problem is if our aggregation rule is majority and beliefs are closed under conjunction, then our group ends up with inconsistent beliefs despite consistency amongst the beliefs of its individual members. Moreover, if, as we are presently assuming, any believed proposition is also known our group violates the closure of knowledge under conjunction. Clearly, something has to give in order to restore consistency. One option is to replace majority rule with a different aggregation procedure. After all, given the group's knowledge that p and that q, it should also know p & q. We might assign more weight to the competence of individual 1 in determining the group's knowledge. But such a dictatorial procedure fails to reap the epistemic benefits of more inclusive structures. 29 A more promising procedure is for the group to first form majority beliefs in each of p and q, and then form belief in the conclusion p & q on the basis of group-level deductive reasoning from those premises, rather than fixing its stance on q by separate majority rule. 30 The case thus exemplifies the said disanalogy between summation of innermost competences and apt beliefs. Not only does the truth of the group's beliefs manifest its competence, the innermost group competence is nothing more than the joint innermost competences of individuals 1-3. In particular, the group's ability to use majority rule and conjunction introduction consists in its members' prowess with these rules. Nevertheless, the situation or shape of the group is such that the aptness of the group's beliefs is not down to the aptness of any beliefs of its members. In the case of p and q the truth of the group's belief, unlike any members' beliefs, manifest its competence with majority rule. In the case of p & q the truths of both the group and individual 1's beliefs manifest their competence with conjunction introduction. But we rejected the dictatorial procedure according to which the aptness of a single member's belief determined the aptness of the group's belief. The latter aptness is simply a matter of the group making a deductive inference from its beliefs in p and q, regardless of whether any of its members aptly believe p & q. 31 The way the group is situated or shaped dictates that it must oppose a majority attitude in order to avoid violating rationality requirements.
Let's proceed to consider joint intentions. As mentioned, a necessary condition on group agency is that its members individually intend that (i) the group form attitudes together, (ii) they make their respective contribution towards those joint attitudes, and (iii) they do so because of their belief that others intend to make their contribution. 29 As is familiar, if the members of a group are more likely to hit the truth than not, then adding more members under majority rule increases the probability that the group also hits the truth. See List (2006) for more details. 30 Of course the inconsistency could equally well be resolved by the group forming majority beliefs in not-(p & q) and q, from which the group can then form belief in not-p via deductive reasoning. We need a principled account of why certain propositions are treated as premises. Note also that giving epistemic priority to the premises is compatible with the assignment of different weight to selected individual members in determining the group's stance with respect to each of the premises. That's plausible in cases of distributed cognition such as in (SCIENCE). For more details see Pettit (2002), and List (2012) . 31 In both of our examples the group belief is arrived at via deductive reasoning, but nothing rules out basing group beliefs on inductive, probabilistic, abductive or other ampliative reasoning.
While 'intention' is here used as a verb rather than as an adverb, we can think of (i)-(iii) either as for the future or as in action, where the former are prior to action, and the latter are contemporaneous with action. Exactly how the two are related is a vexed issue when what is done intentionally is what was intended to be done. 32 Some say intentions in action are produced by prior intentions at the time of execution; others say that prior intentions become intentions in action through abilities to keep track of time. 33 Be that as it may. Taking our cue from Anscombe (1963, p. 11ff) , both conceptions are compatible with the claim that acting intentionally involves selfknowledge: when S performs action ø intentionally, S knows why she is ø-ing. For S to ø intentionally is for her to act for reason r , which requires knowledge that r is why she is ø-ing. We can also say that prospective intention requires knowledge that S intends to ø. Since to intend to ø is to intend to act for r , S's knowledge that she intends to ø is knowledge that r is why she intends to ø. Also, S's knowledge that she intends to ø involves belief that she is going to ø for r . Now, let's apply the foregoing epistemic account of intentions to (i)-(iii) when understood in terms of intention in action: an individual member S of a group knows that (i) forming attitudes together is why the group act, (ii) making individual contribution ø towards the group's joint attitudes is why S is ø-ing, and (iii) Sis ø-ing because of her belief that others intend to make their individual contribution ø* towards those attitudes. Similarly, the intentions in (i)-(iii) can be understood as prospective in which case: S knows that (i) forming attitudes together is why the group intends to act, (ii) making individual contribution ø towards the group's joint attitudes is why S intends to ø, and (iii) S intends to ø because of her belief that others intend to make their individual contribution ø* towards those attitudes. Moreover, S's knowledge that she intends to ø involves belief that she is going to ø for those reasons.
The details are bound to vary from group to group, but in the present context joint attitudes are confined to apt group beliefs, and so ø and ø* can be interpreted as apt individual beliefs contributing towards the aptness of group beliefs. Consequently, the relevant knowledge in (i)-(iii) would consist in certain second-order apt beliefs: apt individual beliefs about those apt individual beliefs that contribute towards the aptness of group beliefs. That is to say, when S is a member of a group that forms apt beliefs, S has a second-order competence to make her first-order competence count (maximally) towards the aptness of those group beliefs. Given reflective assessment of the epistemic means and ends of the group and its wider context, including strengths and weaknesses of available resources within the group, S manifests her first-order competence so as to optimize her contribution towards the epistemic goal of the group. That may require: monitoring of group-level progress, keeping up-to-date on external constraints, revising strategy in light of feedback, adjusting when new situations arise, collaborating with members on sub-tasks, liaising with experts outwith the group, and so on. S's true beliefs about the aptness of her first-order beliefs thus manifest a complex competence of S's that is distinctively social. According to Sosa (2015, p. 81ff) , an epistemic take on first-order cognitive performance amounts to reflective knowledge of 32 See also Sosa (2015, Chap 1) in which an account of action as apt intention is developed. 33 See Searle (2001) and McDowell (2011), respectively. animal knowledge, but his second-order perspective is construed individualistically in terms of consciously endorsing or aptly grasping cognitive performances on the firstorder. Our point is that in the context of group knowledge, second-order competences of individuals are essentially social.
Let's finally turn to the last set of constraints on epistemic group agency by a collection of individuals, namely the epistemic means and ends as set out by the group's charter and its associated office. We continue to interpret these constraints against the background of Sosa's virtue epistemology. To repeat, a group's charter is understood loosely in terms of the rules, norms and standards, which govern the modus operandi of the group and its members. Likewise, the group's office as specified by its charter pertains to its task, goal or purpose, broadly construed to include individual sub-tasks, etc. Neither need be encoded in writing, but can be extracted from the sayings and doings of the group or its members. Now, whereas individual contributions to group performance and individual intentions regarding those contributions were fleshed out in terms of first-and second-order apt beliefs, the corresponding charter and office can be viewed as part of what the situation or shape must be like for the innermost competences to cause the truth of such beliefs. In the case of perceptual knowledge, the shape concerns the physical-cum-mental state of the perceiver, and the situation has to do with conditions of observation and suchlike background circumstances. In the case of group knowledge, both shape and situation involve additional group-level features. A group is adequately shaped only if internally organized in a way that is conducive to its epistemic aims. One must ensure members undertake assignments in areas of competence, lines of communication are transparent, chains of command are effective, group attitudes are aggregated by principles that preserve consistency, 34 etc. Thus, the group in (SCIENCE) has a structure that enables it to fulfil its epistemic aim, e.g. Drs X and Y are given sub-tasks in their respective areas of expertise. In contrast, the group in (FIGURE 1) has a structure that prevents it from fulfilling its epistemic aim, in that norms of rationality are violated. As being properly organized or suitably structured is fixed by the group's rules, norms and standards, we can think of its ideal shape as part of its charter. Its actual shape is obviously a different matter. Similarly, a group is adequately situated only if the wider context in which it operates is conducive to its epistemic aims, where such context has physical, social and historical dimensions. One must ensure the absence of environmental defeaters of knowledge, the reliability of external sources of testimony, the availability of prior knowledge necessary for the group to progress, etc. For example, Dr X will no doubt draw upon the work of other scientists in the design of equipment, in making auxiliary hypotheses and in the statistical methods and computer software employed to analyze data. 35 Again, as being in a suitable context along those dimensions is a matter of the group's rules, norms and standards, we can view its ideal situation as part of its charter. How the group is actually situated is clearly a different question. Finally, on this picture, the epistemic aims (or goals or purpose) of a group comprise its office. The chief aim of a group in the present context is the acquisition of knowledge, but epistemic statuses other than knowledge may well also be worth pursuing.
Concluding (metaphysical) remarks
In Sects. 2 and 3 we presented divergence arguments against (SUMMATIVISM) according to which group g has epistemic property E if and only if at least one individual i is both a member of g and has E (Eg ↔ ∃i(i ∈ g&Ei)). (SUMMA-TIVISM) is a view about truth-conditions for sentences of the form 'g has E', but also makes the metaphysical claim that g having E is reducible to i having E, in that for g to have E is nothing more than for i to have E. In the case of the property of having justified belief, (CRIMINAL COURT) and (CIVIL COURT) demonstrate that the bi-conditional in (SUMMATIVISM) is false when read from right to left. And in the case of the property of having knowledge, (SCIENCE) establish the falsity of that bi-conditional when read from left to right. Indeed, (SUMMATIVISM) is false even of innermost competences. For example, in (SCIENCE) the research team has a complex competence seated in an organized social unit because of which its belief in q is true. Neither Dr X nor Dr Y has such a competence. It follows that any attempt to identify all epistemic properties of groups with identical properties of some or all of their members is futile. 36 But there is, as we argued in Sect. 3, an important disanalogy between innermost competences and knowledge. Let g comprise individuals i 1 , i 2 . . .i n who are all suitably organized members of g, and let E * , E * * . . .E +n be epistemic properties of the same type as E, yet distinct from E. 37 Consider then the following claim:
(REDUCTIVE INDIVIDUALISM) A group g has epistemic property E if and only if individuals i 1 , i 2 . . .i n are both members of g and have respec-
Again, (REDUCTIVE INDIVIDUALISM) is not merely a claim about truthconditions of sentences of the form 'g has E'. It also says that g having E is reducible in the sense of being identical to the union of its organized members having properties of the same type: Eg = ∪(E * i 1 , E * * i 2 . . .E +n i n ). Whereas (SUMMATIVISM) expresses a strong notion of reduction in terms of at least one member of g having E being necessary and sufficient for g having E, (REDUCTIVE INDIVIDUAL-ISM) represents a weaker notion in that all (or at least most) of the members of g 36 Lackey (2012 Lackey ( , 2014 holds that group testimony is reducible to the spokesperson's testimony, even when that person is not a member of the group. However, (SCIENCE) seems problematic on her view as no obvious individual can be identified as the testifying spokesperson. Neither Drs. X and Y, nor the assistant serve as a spokesperson for the research team. Moreover, journal editors are typically not appointed to issue statements on behalf of researchers who publish in their journals. They do not represent the arguments or views of individual papers, or even intend to communicate any such contents. 37 We shall not provide an account of how epistemic properties are typed, but the intuitive idea is that knowing p and knowing q are of the same type, whereas knowing p and justifiably believing p are of different types.
having E-type properties is necessary and sufficient for g having E. Our contention is that (REDUCTIVE INDIVIDUALISM) is true of innermost competences but false of knowledge qua apt belief. Consider again (SCIENCE). The team's knowledge that q cannot be reduced to the union of Dr X's knowledge that p and Dr Y's knowledge that p → q, because neither forms the belief that q on the basis of inference from p and p → q. But the team's innermost competence vis-à-vis knowledge of q is reducible to the union of Drs X and Y's innermost competences. There is nothing more to the former competence than Dr X's innermost competence in respect of p, Dr Y's innermost competence in respect of p → q, and eithers innermost competence in respect of modus ponens. It's impossible to have knowledge-yielding competence regarding propositions p, p → q and the inference to q, and yet lack such competence regarding q itself.
While some epistemic properties are instantiated by groups irreducibly so, they may well still supervene on related properties of their individual members. Many regard supervenience as compatible with non-reduction. Thus, Pettit (2010, p. 191) , Tuomela (2004, p. 112) and List (2014) subscribe to the supervenience of group judgement or agency on contributions of individual members, yet they eschew a corresponding reductive claim. Focusing on epistemic properties, they advocate what we can call 38 :
(NON-REDUCTIVE INDIVIDUALISM) Necessarily, if group g has epistemic property E, then its individual members i 1 , i 2 . . .i n have respective properties E * , E * * . . .E +n such that necessarily any other group g * whose individual members i 1 * , i 2 * . . .i n * have respective properties E * , E * * . . .E +n also has E ( (∃g(Eg) → (∃i 1 (i 1 ∈ g&E * i 1 )&∃i 2 (i 2 ∈ g&E * * i 2 ). . .∃i n (i n ∈ g&E +n i n ))& ((∀i 1 * (i 1 * ∈ g * &E * i 1 * )&∀i 2 * (i 2 * ∈ g * &E * * i 2 * ). . .∀i n * (i n * ∈ g * &E +n i n * )) → Eg * ))).
Importantly, any such (strong) supervenience would hold only relative to certain background assumptions, such as the constitution of the group (List and Pettit 2006) , which basically boils down to the aggregation rule being deployed. But, List and Pettit (op. cit.) suggest, facts about the latter are facts about certain interpersonally connected dispositions being shared by the members of the group, i.e. individual members' dispositions to follow certain procedures in forming group attitudes. The same can arguably be said of what we described as a group's charter and its associated office. Facts about the task, goal or purpose of a group are facts about what individuals jointly intend that the task, goal or purpose of that group should be. Likewise, facts about the rules, norms and standards of a group are facts about what individuals are jointly disposed to do or say so as to contribute towards completing the task, achieving the goal or fulfilling the purpose of the group. So, group knowledge would seem to supervene on knowledge and other features of individuals. However, one modification is required regarding the supervenience base. Joint intentions and dispositions of only group members are typically insufficient to fix, say, the epistemic standards that govern scientific groups, or the legal procedure of a criminal court. The means and ends of many groups are down to individual intentions and dispositions in the wider society. So, the supervenience 38 Compare with Sawyer Keith (2002 Keith ( , 2003 . base for group knowledge would comprise knowledge and other features of individual members as well as non-members of the group in question. 39 Let's sum up. We started off in Sect. 1 with Sosa's seminal virtue epistemology, emphasising its triple-A analysis of knowledge and triple-S analysis of competence. We noted that while Sosa tends to focus on knowledge of individual agents, nothing in his framework precludes ascriptions of knowledge to group agents. In Sect. 2, we argued that not only should such ascriptions be taken seriously, it's perfectly possible for groups to instantiate epistemic properties none of their members instantiate. Hence, (SUMMATIVISM) is false, and groups should be recognised as epistemic agents in their own right. Section 3 argued that a collective of individuals constitute a group only if certain conditions on joint intentions and organizational structure are met. It was then shown that Sosa's analyses of knowledge and competences find application to groups thus understood. Importantly, while a group may form apt beliefs none of its members share, the innermost competences of the group are nothing over and above those of its members when suitably combined. Lastly, Sect. 4 drew some metaphysical consequences of the foregoing, in particular that group knowledge supervenes on epistemic and other features of individuals, who include both members and non-members of the group in question. The upshot is that (REDUCTIVE INDIVIDUALISM) is true of group competences, whereas a modified version of (NON-REDUCTIVE INDI-VIDUALISM) is true of group knowledge qua apt beliefs.
